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In 2001, Joseph Stiglitz was awarded the Nobel Prize for economics. In 2002, 
he published an article in the Review (Vol. 141, No. 1–2) entitled “Employment, 
social justice and societal well-being” in which he proposes that the purpose 
of economic activity is to improve the well-being of individuals, and that em-
ployment is essential to this well-being. In this regard, his description of the 
negative effects of unemployment echoes that given in the abovementioned art- 
icle by Amartya Sen on unemployment in Europe. While such assertions may 
seem obvious, economic policy often runs counter to the interests of workers. 
In addition to generalized market imperfections, the under-representation of 
workers and the infatuation with neoclassical policies purporting to separate 
efficiency issues from equity, Stiglitz blames the fact that neoclassical econom-
ics treats labour like a commodity. It is up to governments – and more gen-
erally to the international community – to ensure that development does not 
become merely a matter of capital accumulation. Thus, 80 years later, he de-
nounced disregard for the first of the ILO Constitution’s General Principles: 
labour is not a commodity.
And then came the crisis in 2008. In 2009, Stiglitz published another art-
icle in the Review (Vol. 148, No. 1–2) entitled “The global crisis, social pro-
tection and jobs”. This article, which is reproduced here, notes that the policy 
responses to the global financial meltdown and the collapse of aggregate de-
mand had largely been driven by domestic interests. Resurgent protectionism, 
bank bail outs and national stimulus packages were distorting competition and 
incentives, to the detriment of developing countries, much-needed spending 
on social protection and, ultimately, rapid global economic recovery. Warning 
against underestimation of the job-destruction potential of the current crisis, 
Stiglitz argues for a truly global stimulus package, together with a rethink of 
economic paradigms and regulatory policies, financial assistance to devel- 
oping countries, a less constraining IMF, and stronger social protection as an 
automatic stabilizer of economies.
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The most engrossing topic of the day is obviously the question of the global  economic crisis. This article begins by addressing some of the broader 
issues, and then turns to particular aspects relating to decent work and social 
protection.
A global crisis “Made in the USA”
The current crisis is touching every country in the world, including the devel-
oping countries. For a while there was a myth that there would be decoupling 
– that the crisis, which began in the United States, would leave Europe and 
the developing countries untouched. It is very clear that this is not the case. 
Globalization has meant that the world economy has become integrated, that 
there cannot be a major downturn in the world’s richest country without im-
plications for every other country.
Moreover, the way globalization has been managed allowed the United 
States to export its toxic mortgages all over the world. Had the rest of the 
world not bought as many of them as it did, the downturn in the United States 
would have been much worse. This crisis has a very clear “Made in the USA” 
label on it. Not only did the United States export its toxic mortgages, but it 
also exported the deregulatory philosophy that allowed others to buy these 
toxic mortgages and ensured that regulators abroad did not stop it.
The economic downturn is affecting even those developing countries 
which had succeeded in managing their economies well, those that had sound 
monetary policies and regulatory frameworks. In fact, as we looked at the mon- 
etary and regulatory policies of various countries, one of the observations 
made by the Commission of Experts of the President of the United Nations 
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General Assembly on Reforms of the International Monetary and Financial 
System, which I am chairing, was that some of the developing countries really 
did a much better job than the United States. The United States should go 
and study what good central banks do, in India and elsewhere, because they 
actually did avoid the excesses that marred American financial markets. When 
American banks wanted to sell complex, risky derivatives, one of the central 
bankers in South-East Asia said, “Can you explain that?” They said, “No, we 
can’t.” She responded, “Well, if you can’t explain it, you can’t sell it.” Thus, they 
were protected against the ravages of the derivatives which have had such a 
negative effect on the United States and Western Europe.
There are multiple channels through which this crisis is affecting all the 
countries of the world. The most direct channel through which it began was, 
of course, financial markets. Financial flows, which were so strong in good 
years, are now reversing, meaning that access to finance is becoming a prob-
lem in many developing countries. A dramatic fall in the flows to developing 
countries is projected; in some cases, there may actually be reverse capital 
flows. Another channel is the unprecedented fall in exports. The declines are 
of a magnitude that no one ever expected to see. Furthermore, there are im-
pacts through remittances and labour flows. Inevitably, when employment goes 
down, immigrant labourers are among those first hurt. In the United States, 
the banks that are getting bail-outs were told that they could not hire immi-
grant workers, so there have been restrictions on hiring workers from abroad, 
no matter how qualified they are. Job offers have had to be rescinded, and 
immigration is being affected.
Resurgent protectionism and other distortions 
of trade and investment
In November 2001, during the last global economic downturn, Mr Juan Soma-
via, the Director-General of the ILO, made a statement in which he decisively 
rejected protectionism. This time again, we have made that statement, but it 
has not been followed through. Protectionist measures are being taken all over 
the world. It was a good thing that the members of the G-20, at their meeting 
in November 2008, committed themselves not to engage in protectionism, but 
it is a sad thing that they did not honour their promise. The protectionism that 
has occurred has been both direct and indirect, intentional and unintentional, 
but it has been pervasive. For example, the United States’ stimulus package 
included a “Buy American” provision. Clearly, this is a violation of the spirit 
of “no protectionism”. The Government then said this provision would be sus-
pended to the extent that it violates international World Trade Organization 
(WTO) agreements. That sounded good, but the WTO agreements on govern-
ment procurement are in fact between the United States and other advanced 
industrial countries. The message behind that language was in effect: “We will 
continue to buy goods from the other advanced industrial countries, from the 
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rich countries, but we will discriminate against goods from poor countries.” 
This is even more invidious than an across-the-board protectionist policy.
The spirit of international trade agreements recognizes that tariffs are a 
trade distortion, but so are subsidies. That is why there are general restrictions 
on subsidies except in agriculture – and we know that agricultural subsidies 
help to create an unlevel playing field and distort the patterns of trade. Dur-
ing the current crisis, however, the advanced industrial countries have been 
providing massive subsidies to their enterprises, including their financial en-
terprises. Thus, even if there may once have been a level playing field, no one 
can claim that this is so today. How can a bank, a financial institution, or an 
automobile company from a developing country compete with an automobile 
company or financial institution from the United States that received tens of 
billions of dollars of assistance?
It is not only the financial institutions that have received aid. The fact 
is that the United States and Western Europe have signalled to big companies 
that if they have problems, they will be bailed out. Or at least, they may be 
bailed out. This has changed the propensity of these companies to undertake 
risk, because if they undertake big risks and lose, taxpayers pick the losses 
up. If they win, they get the profits. The level playing field has thus been de-
stroyed for years to come, and we should recognize that the old trade and 
investment regime has been – intentionally or unintentionally – altered in a 
fundamental way.
Take the issue of guarantees provided to banks. Even if the developing 
countries reciprocated and provided guarantees to their banks, symmetric pol-
icies can have asymmetric effects. A guarantee by developing countries to their 
banks does not have the same weight as a guarantee from the United States. 
This is part of the reason for the anomaly of reverse capital flows. Money is 
going to the United States, which is the source of the original problem. The 
United States caused the global financial crisis by bad regulation and bad 
financial practices, but money is going into these bad financial institutions 
because the United States Government has provided a guarantee.
A global crisis calls for global remedies
Clearly, the current crisis has really altered the nature of global competition 
in profound ways, and we will need to rethink all the elements of the rules of 
the game in order to move forward. It is a truly global crisis, and within a glo-
bally integrated economy, a crisis of this kind can only be addressed globally.
We need a global stimulus package for the world economy, but the locus 
of decision-making remains at the national level. Thus, there is a disjunction 
between what is needed, which is global action, and the locus of decision-mak-
ing, which is national. This is important because each country weighs its bene-
fits and its costs, including the cost of things like the increase in the national 
deficit, as it looks at a stimulus package. The benefits each country looks at 
are the benefits only to its own economy, not the global economy. The result 
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is that there will be insufficient global stimulus unless it is provided in a glo-
bally coordinated way.
To put it another way, in terms of macroeconomics, we usually talk about 
“multipliers”: how much extra GDP is generated, or how many jobs are gener-
ated, by each dollar of government spending or stimulus? However, there is a 
very big difference between the national multiplier and the global multiplier, 
especially in small, open economies. Economists call this difference “leakage”, 
whereby some of the money spent does not stay in the national economy. If 
all the money stayed in the economy, it would recirculate and keep boosting 
the economy. In an open economy, some of the money that is spent goes to 
other countries but stays within the global economy. We are not part of a gal-
axy, and we still trade only within the world, so the world is a closed economy. 
There are no leakages within the world, and the global multipliers are very 
large. As the global economy has become more integrated, the national multi-
pliers have become relatively small, and the net result is that there will be an 
incentive not to have a large enough stimulus.
Furthermore, as each government thinks about how to design a stimulus 
package, the question it is asking is: “How can my country get the most bene-
fit?” – not how the world can get the most benefit. It is focusing on stimulus 
spending that does not leak out but instead stays within the country. However, 
because governments are thinking nationally, the global impact is reduced, and 
the benefit from the stimulus is smaller than it otherwise would be. This is ob-
viously of great concern because the current crisis is likely to be the deepest 
and longest economic downturn since the Great Depression.
Social protection, automatic stabilizers and jobs
The particular problem in the United States is that the stimulus is not only 
too little but also too late, and it has not been well designed. In looking at the 
size of the stimulus, one has to look at what else is going on in the economy. 
Are there automatic stabilizers or automatic destabilizers? When the economy 
gets weaker, spending on social protection and unemployment schemes should 
automatically go up, helping to stabilize the economy. However, at least in the 
United States and some other countries, one of the sad facts of the so-called 
reforms in recent decades is that we have been weakening these important 
automatic stabilizers. The extent of progressivity in tax systems has been low-
ered, and we have moved from defined benefit systems to defined contribution 
retirement systems, again weakening the automatic stabilizers of the economy 
and in some cases converting them into automatic destabilizers.
If one compares the situation when the United States had good social 
protection, with defined benefit pension programmes, and the situation that 
country has been moving into, with weak social protection, with defined con-
tribution pension programmes: what has happened to most Americans? They 
have seen their retirement accounts devastated at the same time as the value 
of their house has fallen dramatically by 20–30 per cent, in some cases 50 per 
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cent. The money that people put away to pay for the education of their chil-
dren or for their own retirement has been wiped out. The country used to 
have a system that would protect them against these kinds of risks, but mis-
takenly it got rid of it.
As Americans see their savings and retirement accounts eroded, they 
will realize that they have to save more. In many ways, in the long run, this is 
a good thing for the American economy: the household savings rate had gone 
down to zero, and that was not sustainable. In the short run, however, it is a 
real problem. Already, there are indications that the savings rate in the United 
States may have gone from zero all the way up to 5 per cent, and it is still in-
creasing. This is a massive change in aggregate demand: if people are saving 
more, they are spending less. It is this reduction in spending that is weakening 
the global economy, leading to a lack of aggregate demand.
The weakening of the United States’ automatic stabilizers is compounded 
by the further problem that the states have automatic destabilizers. They have 
balanced budget frameworks, which means that when revenues go down, they 
either have to cut back expenditures or raise taxes. The magnitude of these 
destabilizers is enormous. A few months ago, before the downturn got much 
worse, it was estimated that the shortfall in state taxes would be around US$150 
billion a year. Now it is probably much larger than that, perhaps US$200 billion 
a year. This means that over a two-year period, the negative stimulus from the 
reduction in state revenues offsets 40 or 50 per cent of the total federal stimu-
lus. From this perspective, one realizes how small the United States stimulus 
package really is – and that it clearly is not up to the task lying ahead.
To put it another way, in terms of jobs, the stimulus package was sup-
posed to create or save about 3.6 million jobs. However, the United States has 
already lost upwards of 2.5 million jobs, and it is still losing 600,000 per month. 
This rate is likely to continue. Meanwhile, there are almost 2 million new en-
trants into the labour force every year. Thus, at this juncture, there is already 
a job shortfall of 5 million, and there will be a shortfall of another 2–3 million 
jobs over the next two years. The creation or saving of 3.6 million jobs is in-
adequate relative to the need. By 2010, there will be a very large job deficit in 
the United States. And I think these problems are being replicated, in some 
cases even more dramatically, in other countries around the world.
The crisis and the developing world
That brings me to looking at this crisis and the stimulus from the perspective 
of the developing countries. There is agreement that we need to have a global 
stimulus, but countries in the developing world do not have the resources to fi-
nance a stimulus package. The United States can spend US$700–800 billion on 
a stimulus package, but most developing countries do not have the resources 
to do so. Unless they receive substantial assistance, these countries will not be 
able to engage in counter-cyclical policies, and there will thus not be a quick, 
robust recovery in a large part of the world that is being most affected by the 
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crisis. These countries are innocent victims of bad regulatory policies in the 
United States, but they will not be able to engage in the counter-cyclical pol-
icies to save themselves unless something is done to help them. However, this 
is more than a question of responsibility or even humanitarianism; it is a ques-
tion of self-interest, because there cannot be a robust recovery for the global 
economy if there is a significant part of the world that remains weak. It is im-
perative that assistance be given.
The Commission of Experts of the President of the United Nations Gen-
eral Assembly on Reforms of the International Monetary and Financial System 
is going to recommend that at least 1 per cent of advanced industrial countries’ 
stimulus packages be allocated to developing countries. We should realize how 
small the numbers are: 1 per cent of a US$700 billion package is US$7 billion 
divided among the developing countries. It is not going to be enough, but it 
is better than nothing. The real point is that we have to explore a whole var-
iety of innovative ways of bringing finance to the developing countries, and 
in the Commission’s extended report, we will develop several ideas on how 
this might be done.
However, there is another problem, in addition to the lack of resources: 
the lack of policy space. If we go back to 1997–98 and the last financial crisis 
in East Asia, the IMF came to the help of the countries affected, but the assis-
tance it provided came with conditions which made the downturns worse. The 
downturns became recessions, and recessions became depressions.
Some people might say that we will not have another Great Depression 
because today we know what to do and are so much smarter than we were in 
the 1930s. We should remember that, a decade ago, we were almost as smart 
as we are today, but the IMF and the United States Treasury went into Indo-
nesia, gave advice about what to do with its financial system, and managed 
to destroy it. They imposed conditions that led to a deep depression in Indo-
nesia: the unemployment rate in the central island of Java went up to 40 per 
cent. Anybody who thinks we are so smart today that we can avoid a depres-
sion should remember what happened in Java just a decade ago. Some of the 
same people who were in policy-making positions then may still be in policy-
making positions today. Maybe they have learned their lesson, but maybe they 
have the same mental framework. We do not know, but we should obviously 
be concerned.
What happened ten years ago has another important implication. Be-
cause the countries in East Asia were so deeply affected by the IMF’s misman-
agement of these crises, many countries in that region – and, actually, many 
countries all over the developing world – have said they would never let this 
happen to them again. I was talking to the Prime Minister of one of the coun-
tries and he said, “We were in the class of ’97. We learned what happened if 
you do not have enough reserves.” The class of ’97, and those who studied 
the lessons of the class of ’97, have accumulated huge amounts of reserves, in 
the trillions of dollars. That is good for them and means that they are more 
protected. However, this presents a problem for the global economy because 
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these people are receiving income which they are not spending. It is like bury- 
ing income in the ground, which is exacerbating the lack of global aggregate 
demand. The lack of global aggregate demand is, in a sense, one of the funda-
mental problems underlying this crisis.
Market failures and the role of government
I think it is important, as we think about this crisis, to keep in mind the un-
derlying problems. At the beginning of the crisis, a reporter asked President 
Bush what the problem was. His reply was, “Well, we built too many houses.” 
It was true that we had built too many houses, but market economies are not 
supposed to build too many houses in the wrong places and beyond people’s 
ability to afford them. The question we need to ask is: why did the market 
economy fail? People are now saying that there was excessively lax monetary 
policy and weak regulation. But then one has to ask, why were there these 
excessively lax monetary policies and weak regulation? Unless we ask those 
questions, we will not understand what to do about the current crisis.
One of the reasons that there were lax regulations was the misguided 
economic philosophy that said unfettered markets are the best way of run-
ning an economy, since markets are self-adjusting. Fortunately, almost every-
body recognizes that this market fundamentalist view is wrong. Even Alan 
Greenspan, the former Chairman of the Federal Reserve, who is viewed as the 
high priest of market fundamentalism, has said, “I made a mistake.” He learned 
this lesson at a great cost to everybody in the world, but at least he learned it. 
Some people have not quite learned. Markets are not self-regulating; there is 
an important role for government to try to make the market economy work. 
Markets are at the core of a well-functioning economy, but, by themselves, 
they are not enough. There needs to be a balance between the role of the mar-
ket and the role of the government. Understanding when markets work and 
when they do not, and the limitations of markets as well as the limitations of 
government, is an essential part of developing appropriate policy frameworks.
The second question is why monetary policies were so lax. Why did 
Greenspan create a bubble? Again, there is a very simple answer: in the ab-
sence of lax monetary policy, there would have been insufficient aggregate de-
mand in the United States and in the world. Greenspan allowed this in order 
to keep the American economy going. But why was there insufficient aggregate 
demand? In a globalized economy, we can only really answer these questions 
at the global level. Again, there are two answers. One is that, over the past 30 
years particularly, there has been an increase in inequality. In effect, we have 
been transferring money from the poor to the rich, from people who would 
spend the money to people who do not need to spend the money, and the re-
sult of that is weaker aggregate demand.
The United States thought it could solve the problem: Americans who 
had no money were told to keep spending as if they had it. They enjoyed 
it for a while. A massive debt finance bubble enabled them to continue to 
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spend. The richest country in the world was living beyond its means. When 
the United States was criticized, the Secretary of the Treasury said that the 
world should be thankful, because if Americans were not spending so much, 
the global economy would be weak. There was a sense in which he was right, 
but if it is true that the global economic system requires the richest people 
in the world to spend beyond their means, there is a fundamental flaw in the 
global economic system.
The problem is that the system is now broken, because it was based on 
American consumers spending beyond their means by borrowing and borrow-
ing and borrowing; it was based on a bubble and house prices that were out of 
line. But the bubble has broken, and people now know they cannot continue 
to finance consumption in this way. One might say that the engine of global 
economic growth has been taken away.
Global inequality was one of the reasons that monetary policy was weak, 
but the other reason was the massive build-up of reserves that countries en-
gaged in to protect themselves from having to turn to the IMF in case of eco-
nomic volatility.
The reason I emphasize these more fundamental problems is that in the 
current discussions in the G-20 and other forums there is a lot of focus on try-
ing to fix the regulatory system and a lot of attention to providing some short-
run stimulus. The question is, what is going to happen in two or three years’ 
time? What is going to replace the sources of aggregate demand that fuelled 
the global economy in the period 2003–07, or even before that? We have gone 
from one bubble to another, from one unsustainable basis to another unsus-
tainable basis, and unless we make more fundamental reforms, we will not 
be able to return to sustainable, robust economic growth. That is why I have 
tried to emphasize here some of the more fundamental problems underlying 
the current crisis.
Competing paradigms, aggregate demand 
and wages
I now turn to some of the underlying ideas and economic paradigms, which are 
important in order to understand the requisite policy responses. For the past 
several decades, there have been two paradigms that have been waging war 
with each other for the hearts and minds of people all over the world. One was 
the “market-fundamentalism” model, which I have referred to above, based on 
rational individuals with rational expectations, acting in perfectly competitive 
markets with profit-making competitive firms. The view was that unfettered 
markets were sufficient to ensure economic efficiency. The best role for gov-
ernment was a limited one, and somehow the benefits of the growth that this 
would engender would trickle down to everybody in society.
The other model was based on a set of ideas that has many sources and 
many strands. I will pick up one of them, emphasized by Keynes, which held 
that markets do not always work well or self-correct. After all, the Great De-
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pression did happen. There are two separate strands of Keynesian economics, 
one of which has been more influential but, unfortunately, largely wrong. It 
goes back to John Hicks and was disseminated most effectively by Paul Sam-
uelson. This strand argued that the problem in the market economy was rigid 
wages, and that if it were not for wage rigidities, the economy would work in 
the way that classical economics predicted: markets would clear, everything 
would be fine, and Adam Smith would be in heaven. (Yet, Adam Smith actu-
ally understood Adam Smith much better than his modern descendants. He 
understood that markets do not always work well. He understood the import- 
ance of competition in ensuring efficiency, but that firms always try to restrict 
competition, and that you need to have competition. But the modern descend-
ants of Adam Smith only read the parts of Adam Smith that they like.)
Modern economics explains why that tradition of Adam Smith was 
wrong. My own work on asymmetric information – simply the notion that 
some people know things that other people do not – showed that the reason 
why the invisible hand of the market often seems invisible is that it is not there. 
Markets are not, in general, efficient. This important idea is a very simple one, 
but it has not been taken fully on board by those who believe that markets 
are always efficient.
Many adherents of the rigid-wage Keynesian view argued for what was 
called the neoclassical synthesis, which said that the economy had two regimes, 
one in which things worked perfectly and in which Adam Smith was right, and 
another regime in which there was unemployment. All that was required was 
to ensure the economy was at full employment in order to ensure that mar-
kets work perfectly.
This conclusion is not based on economic science. It is neither a the- 
orem nor an empirical “finding”. It is an article of faith. A moment’s reflection 
suggests that the underlying logic is very peculiar. It is much more reasonable 
to say that a complete breakdown of the economy, like we are seeing today 
and saw in the Great Depression, is symptomatic of a market failure so large 
that it cannot be ignored. Even market advocates say that something is wrong 
today. There are many other circumstances where markets are not perfectly ef-
ficient, where things are not working well, but the failures are harder to detect 
or predict. What we are seeing is the tip of the iceberg, but underneath there 
are smaller market inefficiencies on a massive scale that we ought to be aware 
of. In my own work I have tried to expose a number of these.
The implication of the Keynesian rigid-wage theory was very invidious 
but very pervasive: if rigid wages are the reason the economy is not working 
as well as Adam Smith said it should, what is the solution? Get rid of the rigid 
wages, and let labour markets be more “flexible”. That has been the basis of a 
whole set of doctrines undermining job protections and labour rights.
Another strand that has grown out of Keynes, which I believe is much 
more fundamental, is due to Irving Fisher and Hyman Minsky (who has be-
come much more fashionable). Much of my work during the past quarter-
century has been in this tradition. Part of the motivation of our work was a 
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simple observation: wages are not rigid. In the Great Depression wages fell 
by about one-third. How can anyone say that wages are rigid when they are 
falling, and by that amount?
The problem that Keynes recognized was that wages can be too flex- 
ible. Indeed, when wages fall, people’s income falls and their ability to demand 
goods falls as well. Lack of aggregate demand was the problem with the Great 
Depression, just as lack of aggregate demand is the problem today. Imposing 
more wage flexibility can result in exacerbating the underlying problem of lack 
of aggregate demand.
Because of this current crisis, it is clear that almost no one today can be-
lieve in the rational expectations model and the efficient markets model. I say 
“almost no one” because there are a number of American academics who seem 
impervious to what has happened; no evidence will change their beliefs. They 
continue to believe that markets are fully efficient, even as unemployment goes 
up and as symptoms of irrationality become so evident. Yet once we reject the 
market fundamentalists, the question now is to try to understand the ways in 
which markets fail. The two contrasting Keynesian views – the rigid wage versus 
the problem of excessive flexibility – give two different ways of thinking about 
what is wrong and two very different policy responses.
Downward flexibility of wages or, to put it another way, deflation is a con-
cern partly because of the loss of aggregate demand, as I have emphasized, but 
there is also another reason. The presence of deflation when debt contracts are 
nominal, not indexed, means that there will be problems of bankruptcy. Bank-
ruptcy is costly and disruptive. Periods of deflation have historically been very 
difficult periods, with weak growth. Deflation was a problem in the United States 
and Japan in the late 1990s, and there is a worry about it being a problem today.
Bankruptcy is a concern because you can lose organizational capital if it 
is not well managed. If it is well managed, it is just a financial reorganization, 
which is an important point to realize. A lot of people today are excessively 
afraid of bankruptcy because it has been, in some instances, very badly man-
aged. However, well-managed bankruptcies – as provided for under Chap- 
ter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code, for example – can maintain the 
integrity of the firms and be an effective way of going forward. One should 
not be afraid of it, though, to be sure, it is not costless.
The nature of the problem that we face today can be put in the follow-
ing way. The people in the global economy have the same skills as before the 
crisis, and the machines and real resources are the same as before the crisis. 
The problem is that there is an organizational failure, a coordination failure, 
and a macroeconomic failure. We are failing to put to work these human and 
physical resources to produce output. What this highlights is the importance 
of economic policy and organization. It is not our resources that have dis- 
appeared. It is the way we organize those resources to create jobs and to create 
value. The challenge, in going forward, is to try to create the aggregate de-
mand that will put those resources back to work. The question is: what kinds 
of policies and reforms are likely to do that? If we start asking that question, 
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we realize that many of our policy frameworks in recent decades have been 
making things worse. I have already mentioned that we have weakened our 
automatic stabilizers by weakening social protection, and we have destabilized 
the economy by making wages more flexible rather than providing job secur-
ity. We have created greater anxiety, which, in times like this, increases savings 
rates and weakens consumption. All of these so-called reforms have made our 
economic system less stable and less able to weather a storm.
The lending crunch, bank bail-outs and the social 
consequences of skewed incentives
In addition to the inadequacies of the stimulus, which I have already men-
tioned, another big problem facing the United States today in designing an 
effective recovery programme to address the economic crisis has been figur-
ing out what to do with the failed banking and financial system. We all know 
what needs to be done, but it will be a challenge. We want to restart lending 
in a way that puts the least burden on the government deficit and debt. Unfor-
tunately, the bank bail-outs have done just the opposite: hundreds of billions 
of dollars have been spent, increasing the national debt but with no increase 
in lending. If the United States had taken US$700 billion and created a new 
bank, unburdened with the past, and allowed it to leverage 12 to 1 – which is 
very modest compared to the risky 30 to 1, 50 to 1, and up to 100 to 1 lever-
age that the banks being bailed out had – at just 12 to 1 that 700 billion would 
have created US$8.4 trillion of lending capacity. That US$700 billion could thus 
have been used to generate all the lending capacity required, including loans 
for small businesses and to maintain enterprises. The profits from the new bank 
would have paid back the Government. Instead, it was decided to spend the 
money in ways that protect some existing vested interests.
It is simple to understand what has happened: banks in the United States 
created some toxic assets. Some of them were sold to Europe, but a lot of them 
are still held back in the United States. The mistakes have been made, and a 
basic law in economics is to let bygones be bygones. The losses are there. The 
banks loaned on the basis of a bubble, and the bubble has broken. Nothing 
is going to change that. A lot of people, in the financial sector and elsewhere, 
want everyone to believe that somehow if there were just a restoration of con-
fidence, the losses would disappear. I wish that they were right, but they are 
wrong. There was a bubble that was apparent at the time and is doubly appar-
ent now. Now the question is: who bears the losses? This is close to a zero sum 
game. What do the banks want? It is very easy: the banks want the American 
taxpayer to take up those losses. If I were a banker, I would want it too. No 
one likes to bear the losses or consequences of their mistakes. They are try-
ing, in one surreptitious way or another, one non-transparent way or another, 
to force those losses onto the American taxpayer. The irony is that a lack of 
transparency got us into this mess, and now some people are trying to use a 
lack of transparency to get us out of this mess.
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An example of a non-transparent way of doing this is to insure the losses. 
You take a bundle of toxic assets, and you say, I will insure the loss. But that 
does not make the loss go away: it just puts the loss onto the balance sheet of 
the United States Government. However, there is a difference between the ac-
counting frameworks. Moving the losses off the bank’s balance sheet shows up 
as a gain to the bank, so it looks better. However, the United States Government 
does not keep its books in a way that shows the expected losses, as the losses 
are not recorded until they occur. We can all go through the fantasy of saying, 
look, we solved the problem, but only because we were being non-transparent. 
It is a good trick, but it does not solve the problem because in a few years’ time 
the national debt of the United States is going to be larger, possibly much larger.
In fact, it is worse than a zero sum game, it is a negative sum game. If 
you do not get incentives right, you get bad behaviour, and part of the prob-
lem of the financial sector is that incentives have consistently been bad. As the 
United States was pouring money into the banks, and the banks were taking 
money out in bonuses and paying dividends, people looked at this behaviour 
and said: are these bankers not terrible? Everybody says, yes, American bank-
ers are ethically challenged. That may be true. However, the main problem is 
that they were responding to perverse incentives, just as earlier they responded 
to incentives which encouraged them to act in a short-sighted way and engage 
in excessive risk-taking. In both instances, they behaved in the way that incen-
tives drove them. In fact, I was worried as I looked at the behaviour of the 
banks in the years leading up to this crisis, because I believed very strongly 
that we should be seeing serious problems. When we did not see those prob-
lems, I worried that my theory was wrong. But the problems that were pre-
dicted have now become manifest.
The insurance scheme also gives rise to perverse incentives. The losses 
of Citibank, for instance, have been insured. They pick up 10 per cent of the 
loss, and the Government picks up 90 per cent. Mortgages are a key part of 
the problem, and they ought to be resolved. Even if a house is “underwater”, 
meaning that the value of the mortgage is much greater than the value of the 
house, it would be better for everybody if people got to stay in their homes. 
It does no one any good to throw people out of their homes: the house gets 
wrecked, and the community is weakened. Millions of Americans are losing 
their homes, and with their homes their life savings. The United States has a 
social problem, not just an economic problem.
We need to do something about this, but the provision of insurance to the 
banks against losses makes it even worse. For example, take a mortgage that 
ought to be resolved. There is a small probability that the price of the house 
goes up. If it is not resolved and the price goes up, Citibank gets to keep the 
gain. If the price goes down, which is very likely, the American taxpayer bears 
the loss. It is a heads-I-win, tails-you-lose situation. This has created a situation 
where banks have an incentive not to resolve these mortgages and to engage 
in excessive risk-taking behaviour. It has created asymmetric incentives. That 
is why this is a negative sum game.
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More broadly, the United States Government has provided most of the 
capital for several of the major banks, but it does not have control of decision-
making in these banks. This is true not only in the United States but also in 
other countries – wherever there is a disparity between who provides the cap-
ital and who is making the decisions, there are perverse incentives. These are 
the first laws of economics. Perverse incentives produce bad behaviour, which 
destroys wealth. In other words, these countries have created incentives for 
wealth destruction rather than wealth creation.
These budget deficits will have long-term effects. A few years ago, Presi-
dent Bush said to the American people: “We have a problem. Our social secur-
ity (which is America’s old-age public pension programme) is broken. If we 
do not do something about it, we will have to break the covenant, the social 
contract. It will also break our economy.” At that time, the size of the deficit in 
social security – known as the 75-year deficit – was about US$560 billion. For 
less than what was spent on bailing out the sick banks, which are still sick, the 
United States’ social security system could have been put on a sound financial 
basis for generations to come. All the retirees for the next 75 years could have 
been told that they do not have to worry about their retirement. Now Presi-
dent Obama is also saying that social security has to be re-examined because 
the funds are not available.
Resources are limited – which is the subject of economics – so choices 
must be made about how to use those limited resources. Some poor choices 
have been made in how to bail out ailing banks. And those choices have social 
and economic consequences, one of which is that there will be elderly people 
whose retirement benefits will be put in jeopardy.
Concluding remarks
As we approach the problems posed by the current crisis, it is imperative to 
keep in mind the importance of maintaining the automatic stabilizers and the 
social protections. For a robust and sustained recovery, we must also address 
the underlying problem of insufficiency of aggregate demand, caused by global 
inequality as well as inequality within countries, and the build-up of excessive 
reserves, which is related to the global imbalances that have been a cause of 
growing concern in recent years. Unless the problems in developing countries are 
addressed in a more effective way than they have been in the past, the inequal-
ity will increase and the demand for excessive reserves will grow even greater.
We have to have a better way of managing global risks – including a new 
global reserve system to replace the dollar reserve system, which is fraying. 
While we all work hard to fix the problems and reform the regulatory system, 
we have to recognize that these actions only fix the plumbing. Of course, it is 
important to have good plumbing. However, if we do not address these more 
fundamental problems, we will not be able to restore our global economy to 
sustainable, robust and equitable growth.
